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Abstract
In their valuable discussion of whistleblowing in healthcare organisations, Mannion and Davies highlight the 
importance of organisational culture in influencing whether people raise concerns, and whether these concerns 
are listened to and acted upon. The role of leadership in shaping organisational culture is well-established1 and 
in this commentary, we will examine the influence of leaders in creating cultures of silence or cultures of voice. 
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Introduction
Whistleblowing is frequently portrayed as the act of 
courageous individuals ‘speaking truth to power,’ a framing 
of the phenomenon which assumes efforts to raise concerns 
will invariably be met by resistance from those in power. And 
sadly it is indeed the case that many, many whistleblowers 
have experienced responses from management which are at 
best hostile and at worst vindictive.2 Yet taking managerial 
antagonism to whistleblowing for granted may prevent 
us from seeing that such antagonism must be viewed as 
unacceptable. In the case of healthcare organisations, many 
senior managers come from a clinical background, and we 
should find it shocking that (for example) a Medical Director 
will ignore well-founded concerns over the quality or safety 
of patient care, perhaps even victimising the individual who 
raised them. Changing the way healthcare organisations 
respond to whistleblowing will require significant changes in 
the attitudes and behaviour of the people who lead them. 
The Influence of Leader Behaviours
The strategic decisions of leaders play an important role in 
influencing culture, but leader behaviours are also hugely 
important. If senior management (which includes senior 
clinicians) are not seen as responding to staff concerns, or 
worse, are seen to victimise staff who raise concerns, then a 
culture of silence will reign. Leaders act as role models, their 
willingness to listen, to be open to criticism, and to admit 
mistakes sends a very clear message to employees about 
the kind of behaviours that are expected. Staff considering 
raising concerns about poor quality care and/or unsafe 
practice are very aware that the organisational response 
will be ultimately determined by senior management. Most 
healthcare organisations have processes in place which 
allow for concerns to be raised at the highest level. Staff 
beliefs about the kind of response they might expect will be 
influenced by culture, but also by their assessment of the 
character (attitude, values, etc.) of key leadership figures. 
Clearly staff will be unlikely to raise concerns if they believe 
these individuals will not act. But they are also less likely to 
raise concerns in situations where they simply do not know 
them well enough to judge their likely response. Perhaps it 
is time for a resurgence in the practice of ‘Management By 
Walking Around.’ 
Even if potential whistleblowers think management will 
be receptive, they may be discouraged from speaking up 
for fear of hostility from their colleagues.3 As we discuss 
below, leaders need to engage in sensegiving to reframe 
whistleblowing as a positive and valuable act. There is a trend 
to move away from the whistleblowing terminology to talk 
instead about ‘speaking up’ or ‘raising concerns.’ This change 
helpfully moves us from viewing whistleblowing as something 
undertaken only when all else has failed (which indeed most 
whistleblower protection legislation assumes) to something 
routine and constructive. 
Reframing Whistleblowing
Although surveys show a significant proportion of healthcare 
workers have concerns about blowing the whistle, they also 
indicate that the majority would nevertheless act. How then 
do we explain the repeated occurrence over decades of 
healthcare scandals which involve the same basic story of 
poor quality care becoming endemic in a clinic, department 
or hospital? In some cases, it is clear concerns were raised and 
ignored, but in others it appears staff became so accustomed 
to poor standards they no longer saw a problem about which 
to raise concerns. Newcomers to the situation may view it 
differently, but finding that their colleagues appear to have few 
concerns they may be unsure whether the situation is serious 
enough to warrant whistleblowing. Given an expectation of 
hostility to acts of whistleblowing newcomers are motivated 
to make sense of the situation in ways which privilege inaction 
over action.4 Mannion and Davies5 note that assessments of 
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whistleblowers are strongly shaped by ‘discursive power’ – 
‘control over the narrative, managing ambiguity and handling 
contestation are likely to be central.’ Leaders do not have 
full control of these factors, but their powerful positions 
certainly allow them to influence the process, engaging in 
sensegiving to fashion a vocabulary and framework capable 
of facilitating a deeper understanding of what whistleblowing 
is for, and when and how it should happen. Leaders can and 
should create a narrative of whistleblowing as something that 
it is valued and valuable. One reviewer suggested Virginia 
Mason Hospital’s identification of patients as the ultimate 
stakeholder was an example, as it would allow leaders to 
frame speaking up as being for the patient’s benefit, rather 
than the organisation’s, thus making it more likely that staff 
would view raising concerns as legitimate and important. 
Never Mind the Motive, Are Their Concerns Valid?
We agree with Mannion and Davies that ‘binary 
distinctions (such as hero/villain; loyal/disloyal; warranted/
unwarranted)… disguise the complexity and ambiguity of 
whistleblowers and whistleblowing.’ Whistleblowers may 
have mixed motives, indeed in rare cases may act entirely out 
of malice. Concerns about whistleblowers’ motivations often 
lead leaders to be reluctant to take their concerns seriously. 
We might draw an analogy with the struggles of campaigners 
attempting to persuade the justice system to review a 
conviction or re-open a cold case. Often their challenge is not 
a lack of evidence, but the reluctance of those in authority to 
examine that evidence, especially if they view the campaigners 
as biased or lacking in credibility. Yet in an era of evidence-
based medicine, clinical audit and big data it should be much 
easier to investigate whether a whistleblower’s claims have 
substance, and doubts over a whistleblower’s motivation 
ought not to preclude leaders from taking the allegations 
seriously, without prejudice to the individuals, teams or units 
involved. 
Leaders Secure Enough to Hear, Listen and Act
A range of policies and procedures have been developed 
aimed at making staff feel more secure in raising concerns, 
but leaders also need to feel secure enough to be open to 
information which suggests potential problems within the 
organisation. A key aspect of this security must be a willingness 
to admit to limitations in one’s knowledge. In his criticism 
of the leaders of Athens Socrates distinguished between 
ignorance and what he termed ‘reproachable ignorance,’ when 
a leader is aware of his or her ignorance but refuses to attempt 
to remedy it.6 Whistleblowing confronts a leader with his or 
her ignorance in a particularly challenging manner. Weinstein 
suggested managers often react badly to whistleblowing 
because they view themselves as ‘rational agents of rational 
institutions.’7 Staff raising concerns are effectively suggesting 
the organisation is behaving improperly, which is threatening 
to its identity and to the self-identity of its leaders. Developing 
a suitably reflexive perspective in leaders might be achieved 
through the use of a mentor or trusted guide, who would 
act as a sounding board for the leader, and a discrete and 
respected communication channel for those with concerns 
about the organisation that they fear to raise. 
Even when a leader is prepared to listen, concerns about 
the security of their position might make them reluctant 
to act. When we consider major scandals in the delivery of 
healthcare, we invariably find that senior management could 
have acted earlier to address the problems, in some case years 
earlier. A Chief Executive taking action to resolve a problem 
in response to concerns raised by staff should be praised for 
this positive response, yet those leaders who act as soon as 
they become aware of the problem know that acting draws 
attention to it and risks them being unfairly castigated (by 
politicians,8 the media, etc) for failing to identify and resolve 
the problem sooner. The scrutiny of healthcare is arguably 
far greater than any other sector, and is curiously intolerant 
of mistakes, whereas other industries which have to manage 
high levels of routine risk (eg, aviation) appear to deal with 
public and regulatory scrutiny which is more realistic (and 
less emotive). If a senior manager can expect to be criticised 
for failings which occurred on his or her ‘watch,’ even if s/he 
was unaware of it, then it is understandable if suppression of 
criticism and denial of the problem is viewed as preferable. 
Kerr’s analysis of what gets actually rewarded in organisations 
is instructive here9 – a cynical analysis would suggest the 
climate currently rewards leaders who ignore problems and 
suppress the facts, so long as they move on before the size 
of the problem becomes too great to cover up. We suggest 
that politicians need to play a leadership role in publically 
supporting leaders who are willing to respond to concerns 
and work to improve matters, and in doing so, help to develop 
a culture which recognises the importance of problem 
identification and resolution, rather than one which implicitly 
encourages suppression and denial. 
Concluding Remarks
The notion that problems with quality and safety in healthcare 
arise predominantly from organisational and systemic issues 
is a relatively recent way of thinking.10,11 Such approaches 
would view whistleblowing as form of feedback which 
provides information to improve the system. The fact that 
many whistleblowers continue to experience considerable 
hostility suggests many healthcare leaders and professionals 
still view whistleblowing through the lens of earlier 
approaches to quality and safety, where errors were viewed 
as a product of individual mistakes, making whistleblowing 
by extension a criticism of individuals. Pratt observes that 
historically medicine was ‘simple, largely ineffective, and 
mostly safe,’ whereas as modern medicine is ‘complex, 
highly effective, but dangerous.’12 This observation, while 
relatively uncontroversial to clinicians, would arguably still 
shock the general public, and whistleblowing similarly draws 
attention to problems which shock the public but which 
are understandable (though not excusable) to those within 
the system. We suggest there is a need for leaders to think 
differently about the organisations which they are leading, 
and to engage with policy-makers and the public in reframing 
the nature of healthcare. 
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